Abstract. A multiparty computation (MPC) protocol allows a set of players to compute a function of their inputs while keeping the inputs private and at the same time securing the correctness of the output. Most MPC protocols assume that the adversary can corrupt up to a fixed fraction of the number of players. Hirt and Maurer initiated the study of MPC under more general corruption patterns, in which the adversary is allowed to corrupt any set of players in some pre-defined collection of sets [6]. In this paper we consider this important direction of research and present significantly improved communication complexity of MPC protocols for general adversary structures. More specifically, ours is the first unconditionally secure protocol that achieves linear communication in the size of Monotone Span Program representing the adversary structure in the malicious setting against any Q2 adversary structure, whereas all previous protocols were at least cubic.
Introduction
In a multiparty computation (MPC) protocol, it is assumed that some of the players might collude together to attempt to determine some other player's input or to alter the output of the function. This is generally modeled as a single adversary corrupting a subset of the players. In order for a protocol to work, one must assume that the adversary is limited in the number of players he can corrupt. Most MPC protocols have a simple threshold requirement on the adversary. For instance, if the total number of players is n and the number of players corrupted by the adversary is t, then a protocol might require t < n/3 or t < n/2.
In this paper, we consider requirements on the malicious and adaptive adversary which are more general than just threshold requirements. If P is the set of players, then the most general way of expressing the limitations of the adversary is to select a subset A ⊂ 2 P , called an adversary structure. The adversary is then allowed to corrupt any set of players in A. This paper constructs a Multiparty Computation protocol that is secure against general Q2 adversary structures. 1 
Previous Work
The first MPC protocol for general adversaries was given in Hirt and Maurer [6] . The protocol was recursive, relying on the use of virtual processors/players and "nesting" the virtualization. The MPC protocol for active Q2 adversaries with a broadcast channel had communication complexity superpolynomial in the size of the description of the adversary structure; the protocol was slightly modified in Fitzi, Hirt and Maurer [5] to yield polynomial communication complexity. More explicit protocols were given in Cramer, Damgård and Maurer [3] , Smith and Stiglic [7] , and Cramer, Damgård, Dziembowski, Hirt and Rabin [4] , each paper constructing an MPC protocol based on the Monotone Span Program (MSP) secret sharing scheme developed in Cramer, Damgard and Maurer [3] . An MPC protocol based on a different secret sharing scheme is given in Beaver and Wool [1] , which dealt with passive adversaries only.
Our Contributions
This paper provides an MPC protocol in the setting of an active Q2 adversary with a broadcast channel. We strictly improve upon the amortized efficiency of all previous protocols, as shown in Table 1 . (Since [3] dealt with active Q3 adversaries only, and since [1] only dealt with passive adversaries, they are not listed in the table.) In examining the table note that d is the dominating term 2 and can be exponential in n and is always at least n. So in addition to providing a strict improvement over all previous protocols, our result is the first MPC protocol secure against active and adaptive Q2 adversaries that has communication complexity linear in d.
Techniques
One way of dealing with disputes is with a technique called Kudzu shares, as first defined by Beerliová-Trubíniová and Hirt [2] . When one player accuses another of lying (or other such misbehavior), they are said to be in dispute. When a dealer distributes a secret s, the shares sent to players in dispute with the dealer are defined to be zero. That is, instead of using a standard Shamir secret sharing, the dealer picks a random polynomial f such that f (0) = s and f (i) = 0 for each P i in dispute with the dealer. Then the shares f (i) are sent to each player P i . The shares of the players in dispute with the dealer are called Kudzu shares. Since the set of players in dispute with the dealer is public knowledge, every player will know the shares sent to players in dispute with the dealer. This prevents the recipients from lying about the shares they received later in the protocol. The secret sharing scheme from [3] can also be adapted to implement Kudzu shares; ours is the first MPC protocol to implement Kudzu shares with MSP secret sharing for general adversaries.
There are 3 types of sharings that are used during the computation phase of the protocol: Inputs from players, random inputs, and multiplication triples for evaluating multiplication gates. These sharings are jointly generated by the players. Each such sharing is a sum of sharings from each of the players (other than those known to be corrupt). For our protocol, each player will remember for each share he holds which part of the sum came from which player. In general, we simply require that each player remember all messages sent and received. This is done in order to facilitate dispute control in the MPC protocol, and in particular in the sub-protocol LC-Reconstruct.
Definitions and Assumptions
Our MPC protocol is designed for a synchronous network with secure point-to-point channels and an authenticated broadcast channel.
We denote the player set by P. The players are to compute an arithmetic circuit over a finite field F of size |F| = 2 κ . We let c I , c M , c R , c O denote the number of input, multiplication, random, and output gates (respectively) in the circuit. The total size of the circuit is C = c I + c M + c R + c O . The multiplicative depth of the circuit is D. We denote the adversary structure by A ⊂ 2 P . Adversary structures are monotone, meaning that if A ∈ A, then any subset of A is in A. We denote by A the set of maximal sets in A (i.e., the set of all sets in A that are not proper subsets of any other sets in A). An adversary structure A is said to be Q2 if A, B ∈ A ⇒ A ∪ B = P. Our MPC protocol is able to tolerate an active, adaptive adversary whose corruption pattern is specified by a Q2 adversary structure.
We denote by Disp the set of pairs of players who are in dispute with one another. If at any time a dispute arises between player P i and player P j , (i.e., one of them says that the other is lying), the pair {P i , P j } is added to Disp. Since all disputes are handled over the broadcast channel, each player has the same record of which pairs of players are in Disp. We define Disp i = {P j | {P j , P i } ∈ Disp}. If at any time the set Disp i is no longer in A, that means that at least one honest player has accused P i , and therefore all players know that P i must be corrupt. We use the set Corr to denote the set of players known by all players to be corrupt. When a player is added to Corr, he is also added to Disp i for each P i . (That is, players that are known to be corrupt are in conflict with all other players.) We define Good = P − Corr. Whenever Corr is changed, Good is correspondingly changed.
Most of the protocols in this paper use dispute control and will terminate when one or more pairs of players are added to Disp. In this case, the protocol terminates unsuccessfully. We handle unsuccessful termination of protocols as in [2] . Namely, the circuit is divided into (roughly) n 2 segments, and if one of the sub-protocols terminates unsuccessfully during the computation for a segment, that segment is started over from the beginning. A new dispute is found at each unsuccessful termination, and since there can be at most n 2 disputes, this does not affect the asymptotic complexity of the protocol. Throughout this paper, we will assume without explicitly stating it that if a sub-protocol invoked by a parent protocol terminates unsuccessfully, then the parent protocol terminates unsuccessfully.
Let M be a matrix over F with d rows and e columns, and let 3 a = (1, 0, 0, · · · , 0) ∈ F e . The triple (F, M, a) is called a monotone span program (MSP).
Define (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x ) * (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y ) = (x 1 y 1 , x 2 y 2 , . . . , x y ) , and suppose λ is a vector in F d . We call (F, M, a, λ) a monotone span program with multiplication if (F, M, a) is an MSP and if λ has the property that
for all b, b . In this case, λ is called the recombination vector. Each row of M will be labeled with an index i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), so that each row corresponds to some player. For any nonempty subset A ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n}, M A denotes the matrix consisting of all rows whose index is in A.
For a given adversary structure A, we say that the MSP (F, M, a) computes A if
It was implicit in [6] that any Q2 adversary structure can be represented by circuit of threshold gates as follows: Each input to the circuit corresponds to a single player. (A player may be associated to more than one input.) The circuit is composed only of majority accepting threshold gates (i.e., k-out-of-n threshold gates such that 2k ≤ n + 1). For a set A ∈ 2 P , each input is set to 1 if the corresponding player is in A and 0 if that player is not in A. The circuit outputs 0 if A ∈ A and outputs 1 if A / ∈ A. It was shown in [3] that if an adversary structure can be represented by a circuit as above, then there is an MSP with multiplication which computes that adversary structure.
The size of the monotone span program representing the adversary structure (measured as the number of rows in the matrix) is of prime importance in analyzing the communication complexity of the MPC protocol, because secrets are shared as a vector in the image of M . There is an algorithm (implicit in [6] ) that allows one to construct a monotone span program with multiplication from A for any Q2 adversary structure A such that d is polynomially related to |A|. (The number of columns of the matrix, which we denote by e, will always be less than d. This is important simply because e < d implies that the image of M is not all of F d , a fact which will be used later.)
A "basic" sharing of a value w created using the MSP (as generated by the protocol Share below) is denoted by [w] . The share of player P i is denoted by w i . We denote the portion of the share w i that came from player P j by w (j) i . Note that in general w i will be a vector, since it represents a portion of a vector in the image of M , although it could be a single-element vector. The length of P i 's share will depend on how P i is represented in the adversary structure.
This secret sharing scheme is linear in that each player can compute a sharing of an affine combination of already-shared secrets by performing local computations. For instance, if secrets [s (1) ], [s (2) ], . . . , [s ( ) ] have already been shared, then the players can compute a sharing of r = a (0) + k=1 a (k) s (k) for publicly known constants a (0) , . . . , a ( ) by each P i locally computing r i = a
The Protocols
This section describes the MPC protocol and all sub-protocols. Proofs are deferred to Appendix A.1.
Secret Sharing
Our MPC protocol uses a "basic" secret sharing protocol and constructs a verifiable secret sharing (VSS) protocol by combining the basic protocol with information checking [2] . The basic secret sharing protocolwhich is described in this section-is essentially the secret sharing protocol of [3] , except that it is implemented with Kudzu shares [2] . We first review the secret sharing protocol of [3] and then prove that this can be implemented with Kudzu shares.
Given an MSP with matrix M of size d × e as described in section 2, the secret sharing protocol of [3] proceeds as follows: The dealer with secret s picks e − 1 random values r 2 , . . . , r e , constructing a vector s = (s, r 2 , r 3 , . . . , r e ). The dealer then computes b = M s = [s] and sends some of the entries of the vector b to each player. It is shown in [3] how to construct MSPs suitable for secret sharing for any given Q2 adversary structure.
To implement Kudzu shares with this secret sharing scheme, we note that the secret sharing scheme described above is perfectly private (proved in [3] ). In other words, the adversary's view of the vector b is independent of the secret being shared. In this paper, we will represent the complexity of each protocol in a table. The columns denote communication bandwidth, broadcast bandwidth, communication rounds, and broadcast rounds (abbreviated CB, BCB, CR, and BCR, respectively). The two rows represent the complexity in the absence of a dispute and the added complexity per dispute. It is assumed that the communication and broadcast bandwidths are stated asymptotically (i.e., the big-O is not written, but is assumed). Bandwidth is measured in field elements, so one would have to multiply by κ to compute the bandwidth in bits.
For a value v ∈ F, we call the canonical sharing of v the sharing for which r 2 , r 3 , . . . , r e are all zero.
Lemma 1.
The protocol Share is a secret sharing scheme secure against any active, adaptive adversary with Q2 adversary structure A.
Information Checking
Information checking (IC) is a scheme by which a sender can give a message to a receiver along with some auxiliary information (verification tags); the sender also gives some auxiliary information (authentication tags) to a verifier. This is done such that at a later time, if there is a disagreement about what the sender gave the receiver, the verifier can act as an "objective third party" to settle the dispute. We ensure that the verifier does not find out any information about the message (until a dispute arises).
The protocols Distribute-Tags and Check-Message are are variants of those used in [2] , so their explicit description is deferred to Appendix A.2. The main difference is that we use an extension field G of F to allow the sender to produce tags for messages of length at most d. Since d can be as much as exponential in n, this is a much larger message size than that allowed in [2] .
Lemma 2. The following four facts hold. 1 . If Distribute-Tags succeeds and P V , P R are honest, then with overwhelming probability P V accepts the linear combination of the messages in Check-Message. 2. If Distribute-Tags fails, then a new pair of players is added to Disp, and at least one of the two players is corrupt. 3 . If P S and P V are honest, then with overwhelming probability, P V rejects any fake message m = m in Check-Message. 4 . If P S and P R are honest, then P V obtains no information about m in Distribute-Tags (even if it fails).
The proof of this lemma and the complexities of the information checking protocols are given in Appendix A.2.
Verifiable Secret Sharing
A verifiable secret sharing (VSS) scheme consists of two protocols, VSS and VSS-Reconstruct. We use the following definition of secret sharing: Definition 1. Consider a protocol VSS for distributing shares of a secret s and a protocol VSS-Reconstruct for reconstructing s from the shares. We call this pair of protocols a VSS scheme if the following properties are satisfied (with overwhelming probability): 1. Termination: Either all honest players complete VSS, or a new dispute is found. All honest players will complete VSS-Reconstruct.
Privacy:
If the dealer is honest, then before the beginning of VSS-Reconstruct, the adversary has no information on the shared secret s. 3 . Correctness: Once all honest players complete VSS there is a fixed value r such that: 3.1 If the dealer was honest throughout VSS, then r = s. 3.2 Whether or not the dealer is honest, at the end of VSS-Reconstruct the honest players will reconstruct r.
The following protocol allows a dealer P D ∈ Good to verifiably share values. To verify correctness, each player acts as verifier and requests a random linear combination of these sharings (masked by a random sharing) to be opened. If the sharing is inconsistent (meaning that it is not in the span of M ), then dispute resolution occurs. In addition, when P D shares secrets, he utilizes information checking to produce authentication and verification tags in case a disagreement occurs later as to what was sent.
We assume that PD ∈ Good wants to share s (1) , . . . , s ( ) . If PD ∈ Corr, then all the sharings will be defined to be all-zero sharings.
, and then invokes Share to share {u
and {s (i) } i=1 .
1.2
For each pair PR, PV / ∈ DispD such that {PR, PV } / ∈ Disp, invoke Distribute-Tags(PD, PR, PV , sR), where
R is a vector).
Verification
The following steps are performed in parallel for each PV / ∈ DispD, who acts as verifier. 2.1 PV choses a random vector (r1, . . . , r ) ∈ F and broadcasts it.
Each player Pi /
∈ DispD sends his share of k=1 r k [s (k) ] + [u (V ) ] to PV .
2.3
If PV finds that the shares he received in the previous step (together with the Kudzu shares) form a consistent sharing, (i.e., it is a vector in the span of MP−Corr), then PV broadcasts (accept, PD), and the protocol terminates. Otherwise, PV broadcasts (reject, PD).
Fault Localization
For the lowest PV that broadcast "(reject, PD)" in the previous step, then the following steps are performed.
If this sharing is inconsistent, then PD is added to Corr and the protocol terminates. 3. 2 If the protocol did not terminate in the last step, then there is a share of some player Pi / ∈ DispD that broadcast a different share than PD. So PV broadcasts (accuse, Pi, PD, vi, vD), where vi is the value of the share sent by Pi and vD the value sent by PD.
If
Pi disagrees with the value vi broadcast by PV , then Pi broadcasts (dispute, Pi, PV ), the set {Pi, PV } is added to Disp, and the protocol terminates. 3. 4 If PD disagrees with the value vD broadcast by PV , then PD broadcasts (dispute, PD, PV ), the set {PD, PV } is added to Disp, and the protocol terminates.
If neither
Pi nor PD complained in the previous two steps, then {Pi, PD} is added to Disp, and the protocol terminates.
Note that this protocol can be easily modified to (verifiably) construct multiple sharings of 1 ∈ F, (i.e., the multiplicative identity). We simply require that all s (k) = 1 for all k = 1, . . . , and u (k) = 1 for all k = 1, . . . , n, and in step 2.3, P V checks not only that the sharing is consistent, but that it is a sharing of k=1 r k + 1; step 3.1 is similarly altered. Furthermore, in the fault localization section, the players check not only that sharings are consistent, but that they are sharings of the correct values. We refer to this modified protocol by VSS-One.
Lemma 3. The protocol VSS is statistically correct and perfectly private. More explicitly: 1. If VSS terminates successfully:
1.1 With overwhelming probability, the values s (1) , . . . , s ( ) are correctly shared. 1.2 With overwhelming probability, for each ordered triple of players (P i , P j , P k ) that are not in dispute with one another, 4 P k has correct authentication tags for the shares sent from P i to P j . 2. If the protocol terminates with a dispute, then the dispute is new. 3 . Regardless of how the protocol terminates, the adversary gains no information on the s (1) , . . . , s ( ) shared by honest players.
The protocol VSS-Reconstruct, is used to reconstruct a sharing generated by a single player. The reconstruction protocol used in the main MPC protocol (called LC-Reconstruct) will be used to reconstruct linear combinations of sharings that were shared by multiple dealers. Since VSS-Reconstruct is largely the same as the reconstruction protocol in [2] , using the authentication and verification tags generated in VSS-Share, it is deferred to Appendix A. 3 .
Lemma 4.
The pair VSS and VSS-Reconstruct described above constitute a VSS scheme.
Reconstructing Linear Combinations of Sharings
The following protocol is used to reconstruct linear combinations of sharings of secrets that have been shared using VSS. It assumes that each sharing [w] is a sum of sharings [w (1) 
is a linear combination of sharings shared by player P i . Note that the protocol has some chance of failure. However, whenever the protocol fails, a new player is added to Corr, so it can fail only O(n) times in the entire MPC protocol.
The technique for using the authentication tags in LC-Reconstruct is non-standard, and deserves a bit of explanation. If ) ] is the first such sharing that is inconsistent, then the players will want to use the authentication tags to determine who is lying. However, [w (j) ] is a linear combination of sharings that were generated with VSS. Each of these initial sharings has authentication tags, but there is no means for combining the tags to get tags for [w (j) ].
So the players need to localize which of the sharings in the linear combination [
] is inconsistent. One way to do this would be to have P j state which player he accuses of lying and have that player broadcast shares of each [s (k) ] (or if P j is corrupt, all players broadcast their shares of each [s (k) ]). Once this is done, the players could use the tags for whichever share P j claims is corrupt to determine who was lying. Although this approach would work, it would result in an enormous communication complexity. Therefore, instead of opening all of the [s (k) ] all at once, the players use a "divide-and-conquer" technique: Break the sum into two halves, determine which sum has the inconsistency, break that sum in half, and so on until the players reach an individual sharing, at which point they can use the authentication tags.
Protocol: LC-Reconstruct([w])
Throughout this protocol, if a player ever refuses to send or broadcast something that the protocol requires, that player is added to Corr, and the protocol terminates.
Each Pi /
∈ Corr broadcasts his share wi of [w]. 2. If the sharing broadcast in the previous step is consistent, then the players reconstruct w as described in the introduction to VSS-Reconstruct, and the protocol terminates. 3. If the sharing was inconsistent, each Pi / ∈ Corr broadcasts his share w
for each Pj ∈ P.
If any player
Pi broadcasted values such that his summands do not match his sum (i.e., if wi = n j=1 w (j) i ), then all such players are added to Corr, and the protocol terminates. 5. For the lowest j such that the shares of w (j) broadcast in step 3 are inconsistent, one of two steps is performed: If Pj / ∈ Corr proceed to step 6. Otherwise, proceed to step 7. 6. Pj / ∈ Corr 6.1 Pj broadcasts (accuse, i) for the player Pi he believes to have sent an incorrect share. 
The players invoke VSS-Reconstruct for the sharing [s (k)
] decided upon in the last execution of step 7.4 (however, they skip step 1 of VSS-Reconstruct, since shares of a k [s (k) ] have already been broadcast).
7.6
The invocation of VSS-Reconstruct in the previous step will have added a new player to Corr, so the protocol terminates.
LC-Reconstruct
is a linear combination of sharings generated with VSS, then with overwhelming probability, an invocation of LC-Reconstruct([w]) will either reconstruct the correct value w or add a new player to Corr. Furthermore, LC-Reconstruct does not leak any information about any sharing other than [w] to the adversary.
Generating Random Challenges
The following protocol allows the players to generate a publicly known challenge vector s (1) , . . . , s ( ) , or the protocol fails (if one of its sub-protocols fails) and outputs a new dispute pair.
Protocol: Generate-Challenges( ) 1 . Every player Pi / ∈ Corr selects a random summand vector s (1,i) , . . . , s ( ,i) .
Call VSS(Pi, , s
(1,i) , . . . , s ( ,i) ) to let every Pi / ∈ Corr verifiably share his summand vector.
Call LC-Reconstruct times in parallel to reconstruct the sum sharings
P i / ∈Corr s (1,i) , . . . , P i / ∈Corr s ( ,i) .
Generate-Challenges
If Generate-Challenges terminates successfully, then the reconstructed vector is random. If Generate-Challenges terminates unsuccessfully, then a new dispute is found.
Generating Multiplication Triples
The following protocol allows the players to verifiably generate random sharings of triples (a, b, c) such that ab = c. The idea is that a random a (k) is generated, and then each P i is "responsible for" creating a random triple
To verify correctness, the P i also creates a triple
, and this is used to mask an opening of
. Once all these triples are checked, the final triple is defined to be (
Protocol: Multiplication-Triple( ) 1 . Generating Triples 1.1 Each Pi / ∈ Corr invokes VSS(Pi, 2 n + 3 ) to generate uniformly random sharings and VSS-One(Pi, 2 n) to generate sharings of 1 ∈ F; these invocations are done in parallel. Denote the random sharings of player Pi by
and the sharings of ones by {([1
. The sharings of players in Corr are defined to be all-zero sharings.
1.2
For each k = 1, . . . , and each i such that Pi / ∈ Corr, the players define and locally compute
where w ∈ F is the unique element that makes [1 (i,k) ] a sharing of 1. The sharings [ r (i,k) ] and [ 1 (i,k) ] are similarly defined.
Each Pj /
∈ Corr sends his share of [a
(The shares of players in Corr will be Kudzu shares, so Pi knows those shares as well.)
Each Pi /
∈ Corr applies the recombination vector λ to the shares of
Each Pi broadcasts D
(i,k) and D (i,k) for each k = 1, . . . , .
Each player locally computes [c
(using the canonical sharings of
Error Detection 2.1
The players invoke Generate-Challenges( ) to generate a random vector (s (1) , . . . , s ( ) ).
Each player not in Dispi broadcasts his share of [ b
] for each i = 1, . . . , n and each k = 1, . . . , .
2.3
If the sharing of some [ b (i,k) ] broadcast in the previous step is inconsistent, Pi broadcasts (accuse, Pj) for some Pj / ∈ Dispi who broadcasted an incorrect share, then {Pi, Pj} is added to Disp and the protocol terminates.
2.4
The players invoke multiple instances of LC-Reconstruct in parallel to reconstruct
2.5
If all the z (i,k) reconstructed in the previous step are zero, then we define
and the protocol terminates successfully with the multiplication triples taken to be (a
Fault Localization
If any z (i,k) reconstructed in step 2.4 is not zero, the following is done for the lexicographically lowest pair (i, k) such that z (i,k) = 0.
Each Pj broadcasts his share of [a
, and [r (m,i,k) ] for each Pm / ∈ Pj. 3. 2 If Pi sees that the shares of some Pj / ∈ Dispi sent in the previous step are inconsistent with the share sent in step 1.3 or 2.4, then Pi broadcasts (accuse, Pj); then {Pj, Pi} is added to Disp and the protocol terminates. 3.3 Each Pm examines the shares broadcast in the previous step of all sharings that Pm generated. If Pm notices that some Pj / ∈ Dispm broadcast an incorrect share in the previous step, then Pm broadcasts (accuse, Pj); then {Pm, Pj} is added to Disp and the protocol terminates.
If no
Pm broadcast an accusation in the previous step, then Pi is added to Corr and the protocol terminates.
Multiplication-Triple
If Multiplication-Triple terminates unsuccessfully, then a new dispute is localized. If MultiplicationTriple succeeds, then it maintains statistical correctness and perfect privacy. That is, with overwhelming probability, at the end of the protocol the players hold sharings of multiplication triples (a, b, c) with c = ab; in addition, the adversary has no information on a, b, or c (other than that c = ab).
Preparation Phase
The following protocol generates the multiplication triples for the multiplication gates and random sharings for random gates. The task is broken into n 2 segments. The number of multiplication triples and random sharings generated in each segment are denoted by L M and L R (respectively), and we require
Protocol: Preparation-Phase
Initialize Corr and Disp to the empty set. For each segment handling LM multiplication gates and LR random gates, the following steps are performed. If any of the subprotocols fails, then the segment is repeated.
1.
Invoke Multiplication-Triple(LM ). Assign one multiplication triple to each multiplication gate in this segment. i) ), sharing uniformly random values. (The sharings of corrupt players are defined to be all-zero sharings.) 3. We define LR random sharings by [r
Assign one random sharing to each random gate in this segment.
Preparation-Phase
CB BCB CR BCR W ithoutDispute n 2 (c M + c R )d + n 5 κ log d n 3 (c M + c R ) + n(c M + c R )d 13n 2 14n 2 P erDispute (c M + c R ) + n 2 κ log d n 2 + nd + d log C 2 6 + log C
Input Phase
The goal of the input phase is to allow each player to share their inputs. We denote the number of inputs in a given segment by L. We require L ≤ c I /n 2 , and we also require that each segment contain inputs from only one player.
Protocol: Input-Phase
For each segment, the following steps are executed to let the dealer PD / ∈ Corr verifiably share L inputs s (1) , . . . , s (L) . If some invocation of VSS fails, then the segment fails and is repeated.
Assign one random sharing to each input gate in this segment.
Each Pi /
∈ DispD sends his share of each [r (k) ] to PD.
4.
If PD finds that one of the sharings was inconsistent, he broadcasts the index of this sharing, and the following steps are performed. If they are all consistent, then the players proceed to step 5. 
Input-Phase
CB BCB CR BCR W ithoutDispute nc I d + n 4 d + n 5 κ log d n 2 c I + n 5 5n 2 4n 2 P erDispute c I + n 2 κ log d n 2 + nd + d log C 2 9 + log C
Computation Phase
After the circuit preparation has been done, the computation phase is just a matter of opening linear combinations of sharings and possibly resolving disputes. Each affine gate is computed by performing local computations. Each multiplication gate is computed by opening affine combinations of known sharings. Each output gate is computed by publicly opening it. 5 This means that the computation phase will consist of local operations and c M + c O public openings.
The circuit will be divided into segments and evaluated one segment at a time. The segments will be constructed such that each segment has no more than (c M + c O )/n 2 gates, and a single segment only contains gates from one multiplicative layer of the circuit. This means that if D is the multiplicative depth of the circuit, then there are at most n 2 + D segments. Each affine gate will be included in the first possible segment in which it can be evaluated.
If a fault occurs in some segment (which is to say that one of the opened sharings is inconsistent), then one or more new disputes are localized, and the segment is repeated.
It is important to remember that all sharings generated by VSS and Multiplication-Triple are sums of sharings such that one summand comes from each player. Since all sharings opened are affine combinations of these, this means that every sharing we will be opening in the computation phase is a sum of sharings with one summand coming from each player. Thus the protocol LC-Reconstruct can be performed.
Protocol: Computation-Phase
For each segment with L reconstructions, the following steps are executed. If one of the reconstructions is inconsistent, then a new dispute is found, and the segment is repeated. 
Computation-Phase
CB BCB CR BCR W ithoutDispute 0 Cd 0 D P erDispute Cn + n 3 + n 2 κ log d n 2 + nd + d log C 2 6 + log C
Putting it All Together
We perform the MPC protocol by invoking Preparation-Phase, Input-Phase, and Computation-Phase in succession. Note that there is a term n added to the number of communication rounds to account for the fact that when a player is corrupted, all players will broadcast their shares sent by that player.
Theorem 1.
A set of n players communicating over a secure synchronous network can evaluate an agreed function of their inputs securely against an active, adaptive adversary with an arbitrary Q 2 adversary structure A with point-to-point communication bandwidth O(n 2 Cd+n 4 d+n 5 κ log d) and broadcast bandwidth O(n 3 C + nCd + n 5 + n 3 d + n 2 d log C), taking 20n 2 communication rounds and 27n 2 + D + n 2 log C broadcast rounds. Here, d is the number of rows in the smallest MSP (with multiplication) representing A, and κ is the size of an element of F.
In VSS-Reconstruct, the players either execute step 6 or step 7. In the last sub-step of step 6, if the shares of non-corrupt players are consistent, then the protocol terminates successfully, and otherwise the players move on to step 7. So to prove that the honest players always complete VSS-Reconstruct, it suffices to prove the claim in the last sub-step of step 7 (which is sub-step 7.3); namely, we want to show that at step 7.3, any player who broadcast an incorrect share in the first step of VSS-Reconstruct will be in Corr. So suppose some P i sent an incorrect share in step 1. If P i sends the same share to some P m / ∈ Disp i in step 7.1, then by Lemmas 2 and 3, P m will label him corrupt. If P i sends a different share in step 7.1, then P m accuse P i in step 7. 2 . This means that any P i who broadcast an incorrect share in step 1 will now be in dispute will all honest players. Since the set of honest players is not in A, this means that P i will be labeled corrupt. So only good shares are used in step 7.3 , meaning that the protocol terminates successfully.
Privacy
Privacy of a secret w before any execution of VSS-Reconstruct follows from Lemma 3. In addition, we need to show that invoking VSS-Reconstruct for some secret does not reveal any information about other secrets. This is because shares of other secrets are sent during invocations of Check-Message. However, note that whenever Check-Message is invoked, the person sending the shares is always in dispute with the dealer, (which will certainly be the case if the dealer is in Corr). Since the dealer and the share-holder are in dispute, one of them is corrupt, so the adversary already knows all shares sent from the dealer to the share-holder, and revealing these shares to other players does not give the adversary any additional information.
Correctness
It follows from Lemma 3 that at the end of VSS, each of the sharings is consistent, which means that the vector of shares is in the span of the MSP matrix M . Any vector in the span of M corresponds to a sharing of a unique value, and thus there is a unique value r such that the vector of shares is a sharing of r. Furthermore, if the dealer is honest, then it is clear that r is the value that was supposed to be shared. Now we must verify that the honest players reconstruct r at the end of VSS-Reconstruct. It is clear from inspection of VSS-Reconstruct that no matter how the protocol ends, the players always end up reconstructing from a consistent set of shares. Also note that this reconstruction uses the shares of all honest players (including Kudzu shares), because honest players broadcast correct shares in step 1, and even if the dealer accuses them of lying in step 3, they will be vindicated in step 6.4 . Since the shares of honest players are sufficient to reconstruct a sharing, all honest players will reconstruct r.
Proof of Lemma 5. It is clear that if LC-Reconstruct succeeds, it will reconstruct the correct value, because in that case the shares broadcast in the first step were consistent. The fact that unsuccessful termination leads to finding a new corrupt player follows by examining steps 6.9 and 7. 6 . To show that no information about any sharing other than [w] is leaked to the adversary, note that in step 6, the only shares that are opened are shares held by a player that the dealer accuses of lying, and so the adversary already knew those shares; in step 7, the shares revealed are those dealt by a corrupt dealer, so again, the adversary learns nothing new.
Proof of Lemma 6. Since at least one player is honest, at least one summand vector s (1,i) , . . . , s ( ,i) will be completely random. Thus the sum vector will be random.
The only way in which Generate-Challenges might terminate unsuccessfully is if VSS or LC-Reconstruct terminates unsuccessfully, in which case a new dispute will be found.
Distribute-Tags
CB BCB CR BCR W ithoutDispute κ log d 1 2 1 P erDispute 0 log d 0 2
In the execution of the protocol, a dispute may arise between the sender and receiver as to what the value of the vector of messages was. The vector is revealed to the verifier using Check-Message, and then the verifier either confirms or denies what the receiver claims to have received.
Protocol: Check-Message(P R , P V , (m (1) , . . . , m ( ) )) 1 . The receiver sends the vector of messages m = (m (1) , . . . , m ( ) ) along with authentication tags {yi} i∈I to PV .
2.
The verifier checks that the points (0, yi), (1, m (1) ), . . . , ( , m ( ) ), (ui, vi) all lie on a polynomial of degree for each i = I. If any one of these |I| checks passes, then the verifier broadcasts (accept). Otherwise, the verifier broadcasts (reject).
Check-Message
CB BCB CR BCR W ithoutDispute + κ log d 1 1 1 P erDispute 0 0 0 0
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof is the same as in [2] with the exception of claim 3, whose proof is as follows: The probability that P R could guess a point (0, y i ) that worked for some m = m is no more than κ/(|G| − − 1) ≤ κ/(d2 κ − − 1) ≤ κ/(d(2 κ − 1) − 1), which is negligible.
A.3 The VSS Reconstruct Protocol
Suppose we want to reconstruct a secret using the shares of some set A of players satisfying A / ∈ A. By the definition of an MSP, this meas that a ∈ Im M A . So there is some vector ω A satisfying M A ω A = a. If This is the reconstruction procedure used in the following protocol.
Protocol: VSS-Reconstruct([w]) 6.3 For each Pm / ∈ Dispi that rejected the message sent by Pi in the invocation of Check-Message, {Pi, Pm} is added to Disp. For each Pm that accepted the message, {PD, Pm} is added to Disp. 6.4 At this point, any Pi who was accused by PD and who broadcast an incorrect share in step 1 will have been accused by all honest Pm / ∈ Dispi, meaning that Pi will be added to Corr. Similarly, if Pi was accused by PD but broadcast a correct share in step 1, then PD will have been accused by all honest Pm / ∈ DispD, meaning that PD will be added to Corr. 6. 5 If the shares of players not in Corr (together with the Kudzu shares) form a consistent sharing, then those shares are used to reconstruct w. If those shares are inconsistent, then the dealer is added to Corr, and the players proceed to step 7. 7. Dealer in Corr 7.1 For all Pi that do not hold Kudzu-shares and for all Pm / ∈ Dispi, the players invoke Check-Message(Pi, Pm, si), where si is the vector defined in step 1.2 of the invocation of VSS in which [w] was shared. 7.2 For any Pi who sent a share to Pm that was different than the share broadcast in step 1, Pm broadcasts (accuse, i), and {Pm, Pi} is added to Disp. 7.3 At this point, any Pi who broadcast an incorrect share in step 1 will have been accused by all Pm / ∈ Dispi, meaning that Pi will be added to Corr. The shares of players not in Corr are now used to reconstruct w.
VSS-Reconstruct
CB BCB CR BCR W ithoutDispute
